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Performance, Stock Selection and Market Timing of the 
German Equity Mutual Fund Industry 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses a key generic issue namely, how to take account of false 
discoveries in empirical work.  This problem arises in many different areas, in fact whenever we 
ask the question: “How many of our statistically significant results are likely to be “truly null” – that 
is “false discoveries”.  There are a number of possible approaches to multiple hypothesis testing 
which attempt to isolate truly null “entities” from the set of “statistically significant” entities - this 
includes the Bonferroni test and the Family Wise Error Rate.  In this paper we use the False 
Discovery Rate (FDR) which measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds, 
whose “performance” has been found to be statistically significant.   
 
There have been no previous studies that use the FDR in model selection.  Here we 
apply the FDR to assess the prevalence of market timing and to investigate the joint contribution 
to fund performance of security selection (alpha) and market timing.  We therefore provide some 
additional methodological applications of the FDR.  In particular we apply these techniques to 
investigate the performance of the German equity mutual fund industry.   
 
There has been little work done on analysing the performance of the German mutual fund 
industry despite its substantial growth over the last 15 to 20 years.  Although the German mutual 
fund industry is small compared to the US, its assets under management peaked in 2007 at 
$372bn and fell to $237bn at end of 2008.  However, it is expected that the German mutual fund 
industry will become more important in future years as reforms to private pension provision place 
greater emphasis on defined contribution pensions (i.e. ‘Riester Rente’) and reforms result in a 
less generous state pension. 
 
We assess the overall success of the German mutual fund industry over the period 1990-
2009 using a monthly data set, free of survivorship bias.  I If we simply count the number of funds 
which are found to have a “statistically significant” performance measure, we run the risk of 
including funds which are truly null (i.e. Type I errors).  For example, suppose the FDR amongst 
20 statistically significant best/winner funds (e.g. those with positive alphas) is 80%, then this 
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implies that only 4 funds (out of the 20) have truly significant alphas1 - this is clearly useful 
information for investors.  A key issue is whether this correction gives different inferences from 
the standard approach of simply “counting” the number of significant funds with non-zero 
abnormal performance. 
 
As robustness tests we also examine performance over different time periods, different 
factor models (including market timing models) as well as the performance of domiciled German 
funds which invest in Germany and outside Germany – the latter provides evidence on the ‘home-
bias’ issue (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Hong, Kubik and Stein 2005).    The competitive model of 
Berk and Green (2004) suggests that entry and exit of funds should ensure that in equilibrium 
there are neither funds with long-run positive nor negative abnormal performance.  Part of the 
explanation for this may be the “dilution effect” whereby funds experience an increase in investor 
cash flows during periods when the market return is relatively high hence increasing the fund’s 
cash position, leading to a concurrent lower overall portfolio return (Warther 1995, Edelen and 
Warner 2001, Bollen and Busse 2001, Bessler, Blake, Luckoff and Tonks 2010).   
 
From a methodological perspective we also show how the FDR can be used in aiding 
model selection in an area where parametric tests of fund performance (e.g. alpha) suffer from 
low power and potential bias (Lehmann and Timmermann 2007).  For example, in factor models 
we usually include variables based solely on their statistical significance - but this ignores 
possible false discoveries.  We show how the FDR, informs our choice of the appropriate 
performance model.  We also use this approach in assessing the dual activities of “security 
selection” (i.e. fund’s alpha) and “market timing” - a distinction referred to as “performance 
attribution” in the literature.  Clearly it is possible for a fund to simultaneously pursue both security 
section and market timing and previous studies have attempted to independently measure these 
two effects (e.g. Admati et al 1986).  We argue from a theoretical perspective that the conditions 
required to successfully isolate performance attribution are unlikely to be met.  Rather than use 
alpha as our performance measure we use an alternative which combines both the fund’s alpha 
and the contribution of market timing to fund returns.  We then adapt the FDR approach to infer 
the importance of this “total performance” measure for the mutual fund industry as a whole. ,  
Funds in the tails of the cross-section performance distribution are often found to have non-
normal specific risk (Kosowski et al 2006, Fama and French 2010, Cuthbertson et al 2008) and 
hence we use a variety of bootstrap procedures in all hypothesis tests, including those that use 
the FDR. 
                                                 
1
  We use the usual language and terminology found in the statistical literature on false discoveries and error 
rates.  The use of the word “truly” (sometimes “genuine” is used) should not be taken to mean that we are 100% certain 
that a proportion of funds among a  particular group of significant funds have non-zero alphas – the FDR even if it is found 
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The US  and UK mutual fund industries have been extensively analyzed and although the 
German fund market is smaller, our sample of around 550 equity funds provides a large 
comprehensive independent data set, which with the use of the FDR, mitigates possible claims of 
data snooping bias if results are primarily based on UK and US data.    
 
We find that around 80% of German equity funds neither statistically beat nor are inferior 
to their benchmarks and therefore appear to do no better than merely tracking their style indexes.  
Next, there is a much higher proportion of false discoveries among the best funds than amongst 
the worst performing funds – so the standard method of simply counting the number of funds with 
“significant” test statistics can be far more misleading for “winners” than for “losers”.  For 
example, from amongst all 555 funds the number of significantly positive alpha funds (at a 10% 
significance level) is 26 (4.7% of all funds) but the estimated FDR is around 80% implying that 
only around 3 funds (0.5%) have truly positive alphas and these skilled funds are concentrated in 
the extreme right tail of the performance distribution.  This is consistent with the competitive 
model of Berk and Green (2004).  
 
For negative alpha funds, around 175 are statistically significant (at a 10% significance 
level) and with an estimated FDR of about 13% the number of truly unskilled funds is around 150 
– hence a substantial 27% of all funds are genuinely poor performers.  The latter result is not 
consistent with the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model or the model of Lynch and 
Musto (2003) whereby cash outflows from poorly performing funds lead to a ”change of strategy” 
and subsequent higher returns. 
 
 When market timing is present and the FDR is used, we are able to explain previous 
conflicting results on “performance”.  Use of the FDR indicates a substantial proportion of funds 
with truly non-zero market timing effects – implying these variables should be included in factor 
models.  Also, after applying the FDR to the funds’ alphas in our market timing models, we find a 
substantial increase in the number of truly positive alphas (compared to the 3F model without 
timing variables).  So our “market timing models” indicate substantial skill in “security selection.” 
However, when we assess “total performance” from both security selection and market timing, we 
again find a very high FDR amongst the best performing funds and the number of truly 
“successful” funds is near zero.  Hence when market timing models are subject to a “total 
performance” measure and the FDR is applied, we obtain performance results for winner funds 
similar to those in the 3F model.  Without simultaneously accounting for these two effects and 
applying the FDR, previous studies may overstate the number of truly outperforming funds. 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be zero, is still subject to estimation error.  Also note that the FDR says nothing about the statistical significance of the 
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In terms of robustness, the above results on “performance” are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar over different 5-year periods, for investment in different geographical regions 
and across different factor and market timing models. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we briefly discuss the 
methodology behind the FDR and other methods of controlling for false positives in a multiple 
testing framework.  In section 3 we look at performance models, in section 4 we present our 
empirical results and section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2.  The False Discovery Rate, FDR 
The standard approach to determining whether the alpha of a single fund demonstrates 
skill or luck is to choose a rejection region and associated significance level   and to reject the 
null of “no outperformance” if the test statistic lies in the rejection region - ‘luck’ is interpreted as 
the significance level chosen.  However, using   = 5% when testing the alphas for each of M-
funds, the probability of finding at least one non-zero alpha-fund in sample of M-funds is much 
higher than 5% (even if all funds have true alphas of zero)2.  Put another way, if we find 20 out of 
200 funds (i.e. 10% of funds) with significant positive estimated alphas when using a 5% 
significance level then some of these will merely be lucky.  One method of dealing with the 
possibility of false discoveries is to test each of the M-funds independently but use a very 
conservative estimate for the significance level of each test - for example the Bonferroni test 
would use / M  =  0.000125.  This would ensure that the overall error rate in testing M-funds 
(known as the Family Wise Error Rate) is controlled at   - but the danger here is in excluding 
funds that may truly outperform3.   
  
In testing the performance of many funds a balanced approach is needed - one which is 
not too conservative but allows a reasonable chance of identifying those funds with truly 
differential performance.  An approach known as the false discovery rate (FDR) attempts to strike 
this balance by classifying funds as “significant” (at a chosen significance level  ) and then asks 
the question “What proportion of these significant funds are false discoveries?” – that is, are truly 
                                                                                                                                                 
alpha of any particular individual fund - conceptually, the FDR only applies to a group of significant funds. 
2
   This probability is the compound type-I error.  For example, if the M tests are independent then Pr(at least 1 
false discovery) = 1 – (1-  )M  = zM , which for a relatively small number of  M=50 funds and conventional  = 0.05 gives 
zM = 0.92 – a high probability of observing at least one false discovery. 
3
  Holm (1979) uses a step down method which uses significance level / m  for the lowest p-value fund and 
higher significance levels for subsequent ordered p-values, but this also produces conservative inference. 
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null (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995, Storey 2002 and Storey, Taylor and Siegmund 2004).  The 
FDR measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds which have been found to 
have significant (individual) alphas and hence ‘measures’ luck among the pool of ‘significant 
funds’.    Note that the FDR approach can be used to assess any hypothesis test across all funds 
and we extend its use in the mutual fund area to provide an indicative tool to assess alternative 
factor models, market timing effects and alternative performance statistics.  
 
Storey (2002) and Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (BSW 2010) provide a detailed account 
of the FDR methodology, so we shall be brief.  Suppose the null hypothesis is that fund-i has no 
skill in security selection (alpha), the alternative being that the fund delivers either positive or 
negative performance : 
 
  0 : 0iH      : 0A iH    or  0i   
 
The issues that arise in multiple testing of M-funds involve choosing a significance level   and denoting a “significant fund” as one for which the p-value for the test statistic (e.g. t-
statistic on alpha) is less than or equal to some threshold / 2  ( 0 1  ).  At a given 
significance level  , the probability that a zero-alpha fund exhibits “good luck” is / 2 .  Hence, if 
the proportion of truly zero-alpha funds in the population of M-funds is 0  then the expected 
proportion of false positives (sometimes referred to as lucky funds) is :  
 
[1] ( )E F  = 0  ( / 2)  
 
If ( )E S is the expected proportion of significant positive-alpha funds, then the expected 
proportion of truly skilled funds (at a significance level  ) is :  
 
[2] 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( / 2)E T E S E F E S             
 
(Similar formulae apply for negative-alpha funds).  Choosing different levels for   allows 
us to see if the number of truly skillful funds rises appreciably with   or not, which tells us 
whether skilled funds are concentrated or dispersed in the right tail of the cross-sectional 
distribution – this information may be helpful for investors choosing an ex-ante portfolio of skilled 
funds.  An estimate of the true proportion of skilled (unskilled) funds A   ( A  ) in the population of 
M-funds is: 
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[3] *A T     *A T    
 
where * is a sufficiently high significance level which can be determined using a mean squared 
error criterion, although setting * = 0.35-0.45 produces similar results (BSW 2010).  The 
expected FDR amongst the statistically significant positive-alpha funds is:  
 
[4] 0( ) ( / 2)( ) ( )
E F
FDR
E S E S
  
      
 
It follows that the proportion of truly positive-alpha skilled funds amongst the statistically 
significant positive-alpha funds is: 
 
[5] ( ) / ( ) 1E T E S FDR         
 
An estimate of ( )E S is the observed number of significant funds S .  To calculate all 
the above statistics we now only require an estimate of 0  , the proportion of truly null funds in the 
population of M-funds.  To provide an estimate of 0  we use the result that truly alternative 
features have p-values clustered around zero, whereas truly null p-values are uniformly 
distributed, [0, 1].  The simplest method to estimate 0ˆ ( )   is to choose a value   for which the 
histogram of p-values becomes flat and to calculate 0  using: 
 
[6] 0ˆ ( )  = #{ }( )(1 ) (1 )ipWM M        
 
where ( ) /W M  is the area of the histogram to the right of the chosen value of   (on the x-axis 
of the histogram) – see figure 2.  For example if 0  = 100% and we choose   = 0.6 then 
( ) /W M = 40% of p-values lie to the right of  = 0.6 and our estimate of 0  = 40%/ (1-0.6) = 
100% as expected.  If there are some truly alternative funds (i.e. 0i  ) then the histogram of p-
values will have a “spike” near zero.  But if the histogram of p-values is perfectly flat to the right of    then our estimate of 0  is independent of the choice of  .  So, if we were able to count only 
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truly null p-values then [6] would give an unbiased estimate of 0 .  However, if we erroneously 
include a few alternative p-values then [6] provides a conservative estimate of 0  and hence of 
the FDR.   
 
For finite M, it can be shown that the bias in the estimate of 0ˆ ( )   is decreasing in   
(as the chances of including non-zero alpha-funds diminishes) but its variance increases with  
(as we include fewer p-values in our estimation).  We can exploit the bias-variance trade-off and 
choose   to minimize the mean-square error 20 0{ ( ) }E     - this we refer to as the MSE-
bootstrap method of estimating 0  (Storey 2002, BSW 2010)4.  
 
Calculation of the FDR depends on correct estimation of individual p-values.  Because of 
non-normality in regression residuals we use a bootstrap approach to calculate p-values of 
estimated t-statistics (Politis and Romano 1994, Kosowski, Timmermann, White and Wermers, 
KTTW, 2006).  Consider an estimated model of equilibrium returns of the form: 
, ,
ˆ
ˆ ˆ'i t i i t i tr X e     for i = 1, 2, …, M funds, where iT  = number of observations on fund-i, tir ,  
= excess return on fund-i, tX = vector of risk factors, ,ˆi te  are the residuals and ˆit is the (Newey-
West) t-statistic for alpha.  For our ‘basic bootstrap’ we use residual-only resampling, under the 
null of no outperformance (Efron and Tibshirani 1993)5.  First, estimate the chosen factor model 
for each fund and save the residuals
,
ˆi te .  Next, draw a random sample (with replacement) of 
length iT  from the residuals ,ˆi te  and use these re-sampled bootstrap residuals tie ,~ , together with 
ˆ
'i tX , to generate a simulated excess return series tir ,~  under the null hypothesis ( i  = 0). 
Then, using tir ,
~
 the performance model is estimated and the resulting t-statistic for performance 
measure, bit is obtained.  This is repeated B = 1,000 times and for a two-sided, equal-tailed test 
the bootstrap p-value for fund-i is: 
  
[7] 1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ2.min[ ( ), ( )]
B B
b b
i i i i i
b b
p B I t t B I t t       
                                                 
4
  BSW (2010) use a Monte Carlo study  to show that the estimators  outlined above are accurate, are not 
sensitive either to the method used to estimate 0  or to the chosen significance level   and that the estimators are 
robust to the typical cross-sectional dependence in fund residuals (which tend to be low in monthly data).    
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where (.)I is a (1,0) indicator variable.  An analogous procedure is used for other simple 
hypothesis tests and joint hypothesis tests on several parameters6.  
 
 
 
3.  Performance Models  
Our alternative performance models are well known ‘factor models’ and therefore we only 
describe these briefly.  Unconditional models have factor loadings that are time invariant and the 
Fama and French (1993) 3F-model is:   
 
[8] 
, 1 , 2 3 ,i t i i m t i t i t i tr r SMB HML          
 
where 
,i tr  is the excess return on fund-i (over the risk-free rate), ,m tr  is the excess return on the 
market portfolio while tSMB  and tHML  are size and book-to-market factors.   
 
Market timing 
Market timing in the one-factor Treynor and Mazuy (TM, 1966) model has a time varying 
market beta which depends linearly on the market return:  
 
,t i t m t tr r e              with  0 ,t m t tr v      
which results in the TM estimation equation: 
 
[9] 0 , ,[ ]t i m t m t tr r f r         where  2, ,[ ]m t m tf r r  
 
The Hendricksson-Merton (HM, 1981) model assumes the market beta depends on the 
directional response of the market: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5
  Alternative bootstrapping procedures such as simultaneously bootstrapping the residuals and the tX  variables, 
or allowing for serial correlation (block bootstrap) or contemporaneous bootstrap across all (existing) funds at time t, 
produced qualitatively similar results, hence we only report results for the ‘residuals only’ bootstrap. 
6The FDR seems to have been used first in testing the difference between genes in particular cancer cells 
(Storey 2002) and has recently been used in the economics literature to assess the performance of alternative forecasting 
rules in foreign exchange (McCracken and Sapp 2005), stock returns (Bajgrowicz and Scaillett 2008), hedge funds (Criton 
and Scaillet 2009) and to analyze US equity mutual fund performance (Barras, Scaillet and Wermers, BSW 2010).   
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0 ( )t t tI v       
 
 where tI

 = 1 when 
,
0m tr   and zero otherwise, which results in the HM estimation equation: 
 
[10] 0 , ,[ ]t i m t m t tr r f r         where  , ,[ ]m t t m tf r I r  
 
The above two models are easily extended to include linear additive “other factors” such 
as SMB and HML7. If 0 ( 0)   this indicates successful (unsuccessful) market timing and 
security selection is given by 0  .  Separating out these two effects is known as performance 
attribution.   
 
 It is possible to have a non-linear relationship between fund returns and the market 
return for reasons other than market timing.  Spurious timing effects can arise if funds hold stocks 
that are more or less option-like than the average stock in the market index (Jagannathan and 
Korajczyk 1986).  Also,“interim trading” can lead to 0   in TM and HM specifications and 
hence to spurious market timing.   If funds trade each period but returns are only observed (say) 
every two periods then the estimated TM timing coefficient will be positive (negative) even though 
there is no market timing skill (Ferson and Khang 2002Goetzmann et al (2000) demonstrate 
another “interim trading” effect whereby the TM and HM timing coefficients  are biased 
downwards if funds successfully time the market over a series of single periods (that is beta today 
depends on market returns tomorrow) but returns are measured over two (or more periods).  This 
results in an errors in variables problem with the resultant usual downward bias when applying 
OLS. 
 
Biases in estimating selectively (alpha) and market timing when the HM (TM) model is 
true but the TM (HM) model is estimated, are also possible.  However Coles et al (2006) show 
that although these individual biases are large, they are almost offsetting and they suggest using 
a measure of “total performance”, when market timing is present.  We use the Bollen and Busse  
(2004) measure of total performance8. 
 
, ,1
(1/ ) ( [ ]) [ ]Ti i i m t i i m ttperf T f r f r         
                                                                                                                                                 
  
7
  We do not consider market timing of factors other than the market return. 
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The iperf  statistic tests the ability of a mutual fund to simultaneously provide stock 
selection and market timing skills.  Different funds may focus on either of these elements of 
performance or may switch strategies through time, but perf provides a useful summary statistic 
to measure “total performance” from these two skills.  We assess 0 : 0iH perf   for each fund 
by bootstrapping under the null using a joint hypothesis test on  ( , )i i   - we then use the FDR 
to inform our view of the validity of 0 : 0iH perf   for the whole of the mutual fund industry.       
 
Previous Studies  
The literature on US fund performance is voluminous with less work being done on UK 
funds – and most studies examine funds which invest domestically.  It is well documented that the 
average US or UK equity mutual fund underperforms its benchmarks (Elton, Gruber, Das and 
Hlavka 1993, Wermers 2000, Fletcher 1997, Blake and Timmermann 1998, Quigley and 
Sinquefield 2000).  However, the cross-section standard deviation of alphas for individual funds in 
both the UK and US is high, and some studies do find a few funds with statistically significant 
positive alphas and many more with negative alphas (Malkiel 1995, Kosowski et al 2006, Fama 
and French 2010, Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan 2008).   
 
Studies which investigate possible sources of skillful and unskillful funds are almost 
exclusively based on US data.  Past winner funds attract additional fund flows (Ivkovic and  
Weisbenner 2009, Del Guercio and Tkac 2008, Keswani and Stolin 2008) and this may lead to 
diseconomies of scale (Chen et al 2004, Yan 2008), dilution effects (Edelen 1999), distorted 
trading decisions (Alexander and Cici 2007, Coval and Stafford 2007, Plooet and Wilson 2008) or 
manager changes (Khorana 1996, 2001, Bessler, Blake, Luckoff, and Tonks 2010) - which in turn 
may affect future performance of winner funds.  Poorly performing funds are subject to “external 
governance” (fund outflows) and “internal governance” (manager changes) which also influence 
their future performance (Dangl and Zecher 2008, Bessler, Blake, Luckoff and Tonks 2010)9.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8
  Note that Coles et al (2006) use a different measure of total performance  than  Bollen and Busse (2004).  They 
also show that model misspecification (i.e. TM is true but you estimate HM or vice-versa) does not appreciably alter the 
power to detect security selection or market timing – it only affects the bias.   
9
 Studies of funds which invest internationally generally also find very few positive alpha funds and a substantial 
number of funds with negative alphas (see for example, Gallo and Swanson 1996 and Patro 2001 for the US and Fletcher 
and Marshall 2005 for the UK). 
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Most US and UK studies using the TM and HM models find some evidence of positive 
market timing and somewhat stronger evidence of negative market timing, for the mutual fund 
industry as a whole.  However, non of the US or UK studies on market timing, appear to correct 
this “count” of statistically significant timing effects for potential false discoveries.10  
 
Studies investigating the performance of the Germany mutual fund industry are rather 
sparse.  Griese and Kempf (2002) using 105 German funds (1980-2000) find no positive 
abnormal performance while Otten and Bams (2002) analyse the performance of 4 portfolios of 
German equity funds and find predominantly negative and statistically insignificant alphas.  
Bessler, Drobetz and Zimmermann (2009) use unconditional and conditional CAPM, 3 factor 
Fama-French model and an SDF model on 50 German domestic equity funds and find 
underperformance.  None of these studies examines market timing or the possibility of false 
discoveries.   
 
In this paper we analyse 555 individual German funds which invest both domestically and 
internationally, we assess performance and market timing effects and measure the overall 
performance of the fund industry.  We therefore considerably expand our knowledge of the 
German fund industry – taking account of possible false discoveries.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In this study we use a comprehensive, monthly data set (free of survivorship bias) over 
20 years (January 1990 to December 2009) for 555 German domiciled equity mutual funds (each 
with more than 24 monthly observations)11.  We have removed ‘second units’ and index/tracker 
funds leaving only actively managed funds.  Of the 555 funds which at least existed for 2 years 85 
invest solely in German equities, with the remainder investing outside Germany (“Europe” and 
“Global”).  All fund returns are measured gross of taxes on dividends and capital gains and net of 
management fees.  Hence, we follow the usual convention in using net returns (bid-price to bid-
price, with gross income reinvested).  Our factors are measured in the standard way.  For funds 
with German, European and Global geographic mandates we have used the appropriate MSCI 
                                                 
10
 For the US see for example, Treynor and Mazuy 1966, Henriksson and Merton 1981, Hendriksson 1984, Lee 
and Rahman 1990, Ferson and Schadt 1996, Busse 1999, Becker, Ferson, Myers and Schill 1999, Wermers 2000, Bollen 
and Busse 2001, Jiang 2003, Swinkels and Tjong-A-Tjoe 2007, Jiang, Yao and Yu, 2007, Chen and Liang 2007 and for 
the UK see Chen, Lee, Rahman and Chan 1992, Fletcher 1995, Leger 1997, Byrne, Fletcher and Ntozi 2006, Cuthbertson 
et al 2010. 
 
11
   The complete data set is obtained from Bloomberg and consists of over 1000 funds, was reduced to just 702 
after stripping out second units and to 555 funds with at least 2 years of data history.    
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total return indices12.  The SMB variables have been calculated by subtracting the total return 
index of the small cap MSCI index from the relevant market index for the specific geographic 
mandate.  Similarly, HML is defined as the difference between the total return indices of the MSCI 
Value index less the MSCI growth index for the specific geographic region13.  The risk free rate is 
the 1-month Frankfurt money market rate.  All variables are measured in Euros (or German 
Marks prior to the introduction of the single currency in Europe).   
 
We first provide a brief overview of alternative factor models before refining these results 
using the FDR.  Table 1 reports summary statistics for the three different models, the one-factor 
CAPM model, the two factor model which includes the SMB factor and the Fama and French 3-
factor model, which adds the HML factor14.  The 3F model is then augmented with either the TM 
or HM market timing variables.  For each model, cross-sectional (across funds) average statistics 
are calculated for all funds over the period January 1990-December 2009 based on 555 funds, all 
with a minimum of min,iT  = 24 observations. 
 
[Table 1 - here] 
 
The factor models give a similar but small number of positive and statistically significant 
alphas and a much larger number of statistically significant negative alphas (Table 1, Panel A).  
The market return is highly significant followed by the SMB factor, while the HML factor and the 
market timing variables are not statistically significant on average.  However, we note a relatively 
large increase in the number of statistically significant positive alphas (from around 7 to 35) and a 
reduction in the number of statistically significant negative alphas (from around 75 to 50) when 
the market timing variables are included – the market timing specification changes our view of the 
alpha-performance of the industry and below, this is examined further using the FDR.   
 
[Figure 1 - here] 
 
The distribution of alpha estimates for the 3F model (figure 1) shows a wide range of 
values. Most alphas are in the minus to plus 1% p.a. range but there are funds with very high and 
(especially) very low alphas.  This implies that the extreme tails of the distribution may contain 
funds with abnormally “good” or “bad” security selection.  This is important, since investors are 
                                                 
12
  These geographical mandates should largely be followed by funds, whereas style mandates (e.g. aggressive 
growth, income, balanced etc.) often result in style drift (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau 2005). 
13
  Use of the MSCI indices allows consistency across factor definitions for “German”, “European” and “Global” 
mandates. Worldscope has greater coverage for our factors but only for “German funds”.  
 
14
  We found no evidence for the inclusion of conditioning variables such as the one-month yield, the dividend yield 
of the market factor and the term spread (Ferson and Schadt 1996, Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman 1998).  
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more interested in holding funds in the right tail of the performance distribution and avoiding those 
in the extreme left tail, than they are in the average fund’s performance. This emphasizes the 
importance of examining fund-by-fund performance (rather than the weighted average of all 
funds) and then correcting for false discoveries to provide an assessment of overall industry 
performance15. 
 
Turning now to diagnostics (bottom half of table 1), the adjusted-R2 across all three 
models is around 0.75, while the average skewness and kurtosis of the residuals is around -0.2 
and 8 respectively and about 45% of funds have non-normal errors – thus motivating the use of 
bootstrap procedures.   
 
How Important are the Individual Factors? 
We know from table 1 that without taking account of the FDR, the market factor and the 
SMB factor appear to be statistically significant across many of the 555 funds, whereas the 
average t-statistic (absolute value) across all funds for the HML factor is around -0.85.  Table 2 
re-examines these results when we take account of possible false discoveries16.  Around 545 
funds have statistically significant positive market betas with a FDR less than 0.1% (at 10% 
significance level), so not surprisingly nearly all funds have truly positive market betas (Panel A, 
Table 1).  For the SMB factor around 420 funds are significantly positive and the FDR is very low 
at 1.6% while for the 17 funds with negative and statistically significant SMB-betas the FDR of 
38% implies over 60% of these are truly significant.  Overall therefore it appears as if most funds 
truly have positive weighting on small stocks and as this strategy is replicable, its contribution to 
fund returns should not be counted as skill. 
 
[Table 2 - here] 
 
In contrast to the rather weak results based on the average (absolute) values of the HML-
beta and its t-statistic (table 1) the number of significant positive HML-betas (10% significance 
level) is 103 ( FDR = 11.7%), with 247 ( FDR = 4.9%) having significant negative betas (table 
2, Panel A) – hence many more German funds are “growth orientated” rather than value 
orientated.  Use of the FDR to provide an indicative measure of the overall importance of these 
three factors, suggests all three factors should be included in our factor model.  Hence, we 
                                                 
15
   The same wide range for the distribution of fund alphas is found for the two 3F plus market timing models.  In 
addition the residuals of funds in the extreme tails of the cross-section distribution of the 3F and 3F plus market timing 
models are non-normal, hence motivating the use of bootstrap standard errors. 
  
16
  Estimation of the FDR when interpreting tests on the factor betas requires an estimate of 0  (the proportion of 
truly null betas across all funds).  The method of estimation for 0 is discussed below.  
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concentrate on results from the 3F model and the two, 3F plus market timing models (3F+TM and 
3F+HM). 
 
 We now proceed as follows.  First we discuss estimation of the proportion of truly zero-
alpha funds 0 , positively skilled alpha-funds, A   and unskilled funds A   among our total of M-
funds.  Then we analyze the FDR for the positive-alpha and negative-alpha funds taken 
separately – this allows us to ascertain whether such funds are concentrated in the tails of the 
performance distribution.  Next we use the FDR to examine performance attribution – that is, the 
importance of market timing and security selection in the mutual fund industry.  This analysis is 
extended to measure “total performance” using the FDR approach.  Finally we present some 
robustness tests by examining performance across different factor models, across non-
overlapping 5-year periods and performance for fund investments both within and outside 
Germany.  Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the proportion of skilled and unskilled funds 
across the different factor models used in our analysis.  
 
Estimation of 0   
The histogram of p-values when testing 0 : 0iH    across funds is given in figure 2 for 
the 3F-model.  Exploiting the fact that truly null p-values are uniformly distributed [0, 1], the height 
of the flat portion of the histogram gives an estimate of 0 .  From figure 2 a reasonable “eyeball” 
estimate would be   = 0.3 giving 0ˆ ( )   = 0.8.   
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Security Selection: Skilled and Unskilled Funds 
Taking the 3F model and our universe of all M-funds, the MSE-bootstrap estimator gives 
the percentage of truly zero alpha funds 0ˆ ( )  = 83% (se = 3.24), the percentage of negative-
alpha funds ˆA   = 17.1% (se = 3.2) and skilled funds ˆA  = -0.2% (se = 0.2) - Table 3, Panel A.  It 
is the estimate of 0ˆ ( )  which determines our calculations of the FDR (for alpha) and this is 
statistically well determined because the estimation uses data on a large number of null funds 
(see figure 2).  (Standard errors are in parentheses and are given in Genovese and Wasserman 
2004 and Appendix-A of BSW 2010).  Hence in the whole population of M-funds, most have truly 
zero long-run alphas, probably very few have positive alphas and a sizable proportion have 
negative alphas.  
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[Table 3 - here] 
 
The most striking feature about the alpha-performance of the best and worst funds 
revealed by our analysis of the unconditional 3F model is the relatively high FDR  for the best 
funds and low FDR  for the worst funds – this is true for any significance level chosen (Table 3, 
Panel B).  For example for   = 0.10 (right tail area 0.05), only S  = 4.7% (26 funds) have 
significant positive alphas but given that FDR  = 88.8%, only T  = 0.5% (3 funds) have truly 
positive alphas - but this estimate is not statistically different from zero.  So, the standard “count” 
indicates 26 funds are significant but nearly all of these are probably false discoveries.  Both 
S and FDR  increase with   but the percentage of truly skilled funds T  is statistically 
insignificantly different from zero (for 0.20  ) - Table 3, Panel B.   
 
For negative alpha funds the FDR  (for   = 0.10) is relatively small at 13.3% so of the 
S  = 31.3% (174) significant worst funds, T  = 27.2% (150 funds) are truly unskilled rather than 
having bad luck.  The proportion of truly unskilled funds T  increases with , indicating that the 
poorly performing funds are fairly evenly spread throughout the left tail of the performance 
distribution in the interval   = [0, 0.2].   
 
Market Timing Models 
We now use the FDR to inform our analysis of the importance of our two market timing 
variables when added to the 3F model (Table 2, Panels B and C).  For example (at 10% 
significance level) for the TM model, we have 60 funds ( S =13.3%) with a positive and 
statistically significant market timing coefficient i  which with an estimated FDR  of 34.9% 
gives 39 funds (T = 7.0%) which have truly positive market timing, while the comparable figures 
for negative market timing are 158 statistically significant i ’s, an FDR = 13.3%, with 137 funds 
(T = 24.7%) having truly negative market timing.  Hence there are a total of 31.7% of funds 
which have either truly positive or negative market timing effects - most of which have negative 
market timing.  For the HM model the latter figure is very similar at 29.4% of funds and the results 
for the HM and TM specifications are very similar.  Hence, we cannot ignore market timing effects 
in our parametric 3F factor model. 
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However, some caveats are in order when considering market timing results.  The market 
timing parameter i  may be biased downwards (but not upwards) because of cash-flow effects. 
When market returns are high, cash inflows into funds tend to be high which leads to temporarily 
large cash positions and lower fund betas (Warther,1995, Ferson and Warther 1996 and Edelen 
1999). In addition, artificial fund returns generated from “synthetic passive portfolios”17 which 
have no market timing ability by construction, when used in the HM and TM timing models can 
give spurious positive or negative values for i .  This is “artificial timing bias” and on US data is 
particularly evident for funds which hold a preponderance of small stocks, value stocks and past 
winners and empirically it results in statistically significant negative “artificial timing” (i.e. ˆi  < 0).  
Also for US funds Kon (1983) and Hendriksson (1984) find a negative correlation between i  
and i .     
 
Spurious timing effects can arise if funds hold stocks that are more or less option-like 
than the average stock in the market index (Jagannathan and Korajczyk 1986).  For example, if 
the fund’s stocks are more option-like than those of the market index, a rise in the latter will lead 
to a disproportionately large rise in the fund’s return and this convex relationship will result in a 
positive  , even though the fund is not undertaking any market timing.  If delta is biased upwards 
then alpha will be biased downwards and if this effect is pervasive, we expect a negative 
correlation between these two parameters, in the cross-section of funds.    
We do not have data on stock holdings of German funds and hence cannot directly test 
for this spurious timing bias.  But we do find a negative correlation of around -0.7 between i  and  
i  in our cross-section of funds (see figures 3 and 4 for the TM and HM models, respectively).18      
Hence we cannot rule out the possibility that some of our positive timing coefficients may be 
spurious and hence biased.   
 
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
 
Security Selection (Alpha) and “Total Performance” in Market Timing Models 
What are the implications of security selection (‘alpha’) when we add market timing 
variables?  Compared to the 3F model (i.e. excluding timing variables) there is a substantial 
increase (at a 10% significance level) in the number of statistically significant positive-alpha 
                                                 
17
   Synthetic passive portfolios” of stocks which mimic the stock holdings of funds are based on the fund’s 
proportionate holdings of high and low book-to-market stocks, small and large stocks, momentum stocks, etc. – Bollen 
and Busse 2001. 
18
 Also for US funds Kon (1983) and Hendriksson (1984) find a negative correlation between i  and i .     
 18
funds, a much lower FDR  and an increase in the number of truly positive alpha funds from 3 
(0.5%) in the 3F model to 64 (7.4%) in the 3F+TM model and 96 (13.4%) in the 3F+HM model 
(Table 4, Panels A and B, respectively).  Hence it would appear that market timing models 
provide much stronger evidence of successful security selection skills than the 3F model.  It is 
also the case that the market timing models indicate less negative alpha performance than the 3F 
model since in the TM (HM) model 126 (109) funds have truly negative alphas, while for the 3F 
model the figure is 150 funds.  Hence, market timing models indicate a substantially improved 
view of the overall level of skill in security selection (alphas) for the actively managed fund 
industry, than does the 3F model.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Even though a number of researchers present results on market timing as described 
above (but without added information from the FDR) there are two acute problems.  First is the 
well documented bias in estimation of the separate security selection and market timing effects.  
Second, measuring security selection (alpha) without simultaneously considering the effect on 
fund performance of any market timing effects, can give a misleading picture of overall 
performance. Clearly, good security selection together with negative market timing (or vice versa) 
may not be beneficial for investors (relative to investing in index funds or Exchange Traded 
Funds, ETFs).   
 
Our “total performance” measure, which takes account of security selection and market 
timing effects on fund returns is ( )i i i mtperf f r   .  For the 3F+TM model (Table 5, Panel A) 
we reject (at a 10% significance level, for example) the null of 0iperf   against the alternative 
0iperf   for 23 funds (out of 555) but the estimated FDR is 98% implying that no funds have 
truly positive total performance.19  There are 158 funds with statistically significant negative 
values of iperf  and with a relative low FDR of 14.3% this implies a substantial 135 funds (24.4%) 
have truly negative overall performance.  Results are very similar for the 3F+HM model (Table 5, 
Panel B).   
 
Comparing results on security selection (alpha) in the 3F model of table 3 with the results 
using our measure of total performance iperf  in the 3F+MT models (Table 5), both give a 
                                                 
19
  The finding of a statistically significant value for ˆA  >0  when testing i  = 0 but a statistically insignificant value 
of ˆA  > 0 when testing iperf = 0, is also consistent with these results. 
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consistent picture of the “performance” of German equity mutual funds.  Whether performance is 
measured using 3F-alpha or “total performance” there are virtually no funds with superior 
performance, around 25% with truly poor performance and around 75% who have zero 
performance.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Robustness Tests 
The ‘home-bias’ mutual fund literature suggests that physical proximity may facilitate 
relevant information transmission, which results in a concentration of fund assets geographically 
(e.g. within a particular country, particular cities or concentrated in particular sectors) and this 
“superior information” leads to superior performance (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Hong, Kubik 
and Stein 2005, Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005).  For the 3F model the home-bias 
hypothesis does not appear to hold for investing in Germany versus investing in firms outside 
Germany.  Table 6 shows that results from investing in these two geographical regions are very 
similar with a FDR  broadly in the 75-95% range (for significance levels 0.05 to 0.20), with only 
a very small proportion of truly positive alpha funds (around 0.1% to 2%) but a much higher 
proportion of truly negative alpha funds of around 20-35%20.   
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
When either the 3F-alphas or the iperf  statistic (for the two, 3F+MT models) are 
estimated over successive 5-year “short-term” periods January 1995 - December 1999, January 
2000 - December 2004 and January 2005 - December 2009, the overall picture remains largely 
unchanged from the whole sample period results (reported in Tables 3 and 5) and therefore we 
do not report these results here.  Hence in contrast to results for US equity funds where “short-
term” truly positive alpha-performance declines from around 5% of all funds up to 2002 to zero 
percent by 2006 (BSW 2010), the positive performance of the German equity funds industry is 
zero over both the short-run and the whole life of the funds (for either alpha in the 3F-model or 
the perf statistic for the two, 3F+MT models).   
 
Above we have reported results based on the 3F and the two, 3F+MT models.  Now we 
assess the sensitivity of our results on alpha and iperf  when we exclude the SMB and HML 
factors and apply the FDR to the relevant performance measure.  In Panel A of table 7 we 
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present results for alpha for the 1F and 2F models and in Panel B for iperf  for the two, 1F+MT 
and 2F+MT models.  We find that the results are qualitatively unchanged from those reported 
above for the 3F and 3F+MT models and hence for brevity we only report results at the   = 10% 
significance level21.  
 
When we add a momentum factor to the 81 funds which have a German only mandate    
our results for alpha and iperf  are qualitatively similar22.  For example, in moving from the 3F to 
the 4F model we find 5 statistically significant positive alpha funds (10% significance level) with 
an FDR  of 57% in both cases.  For negative alphas, the 3F and 4F models give 29 and 32 
statistically significant alpha respectively, with an FDR  of 9% in both cases.  The invariance of 
our results to the momentum factor may be due to its low correlation with the other factors (the 
maximum correlation of -0.25 is with the market return) and hence any omitted variables bias may 
be small23.    
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
5. Conclusions      
We use the FDR in model selection and performance measurement to assess the overall 
performance from both market timing and security selection of the German equity mutual fund 
industry.  When using the Fama-French three factor (3F) model (with no market timing) we find 
less than 1% of funds (i.e. 6 out of 555) have truly positive alpha-performance, about 27% (150 
funds) have truly negative-alpha performance and the majority have zero-alpha performance.  
These results using the FDR (but excluding market timing variables) are broadly similar to those 
found for US and UK funds (Kosowski et al 2006, Fama and French 2010, BSW 2010, 
Cuthbertson et al 2012)- namely, very few statistically significant alpha funds and substantially 
more negative alpha funds.   
                                                                                                                                                 
20
  Qualitatively similar results on the geographical performance are found when using the total performance 
measure in the two 3F+MT models, hence we do not report these results.   
21
  As further tests on these models we have looked at the average Rbar-squared, Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (BIC) statistics for a) all funds, b) German domestic equity and c) German funds that invest 
internationally.  The Rbar-squared and AIC support the inclusion of the market timing variables and the BIC criterion 
suggests little to choose between the 3-factor model and the 3-factor plus market timing models.  Tests of higher order 
terms (e.g. the market return cubed) are not suggested by theory but we found this term to be statistically insignificant for 
nearly all funds.  These results are available on request.   
22
  The momentum factor for the domestic market is from the Centre for Financial Research, University of Cologne 
(see Artman et al 2010).  If we also use the CFR market return, SMB and HML factors over this period our results remain 
broadly unchanged.  
23
   We also constructed an international momentum variable as outlined in Fletcher and Marshall (2005).  As in 
their table 5 for UK funds which invest internationally, we found no qualitative difference in our performance measures for 
this change in our factor model.  
 21
 
 Use of the FDR in model selection, implies inclusion of the TM or HM market timing 
variables with results similar to those on UK and US  funds – namely, some evidence of positive 
timing and stronger evidence for negative timing.  When we examine the  3F+MT models this 
results in a large increase in the proportion of truly positive-alpha funds from around 1% to 7-13% 
(40 to 75 funds) and a reduction in the proportion of truly negative-alpha funds from around 27% 
(150 funds) to about 17% (95 funds).  We also find evidence consistent with “spurious timing” 
which may bias downward, estimates of security selection (alpha).  However, when we attempt to 
mitigate these problems by using a measure of “total performance”, which includes the 
contribution of both security selection (alpha) and market timing, we obtain performance results 
similar to the 3F model (with no market timing).  This demonstrates the importance of using the 
FDR to inform model selection and in using a measure of total performance when market timing 
variables are included in a factor model.  The above results are largely invariant to the inclusion 
of different factors (except for the market factor), for different sample periods and to the 
performance of funds investing in German and non-German stocks – the latter casts some doubt 
on the “home-bias” hypothesis of superior performance due to comparative advantage in 
information about ‘local’ markets.  
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Table 1  Summary Statistics German Equity Mutual Funds 
 
This table reports summary statistics of all the funds used in the analysis.  The sample period is 
from January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual 
funds which have at least 24 observations.  The average number of observations for the funds is 
111 months.  We report averages of the individual fund statistics for five different models (1F, 2F, 
3F, and the 3F+TM and 3F+HM market timing models.  The first factor is the corresponding 
excess market return, the second factor is the size factor and the third factor is the book-to-
market factor. The t-statistics are based on Newey-West heteroscedastic and autocorrelation 
adjusted standard errors. Statistical significance is at the 5% significance level (two-tail test). BJ 
is the Bera-Jarque statistic for normality of residuals.  
 
 1F Model 
       (
mr ) 
 
2F Model 
(
mr ,SMB) 
3F Model  
(
mr , SMB,HML) 
3F+TM  
2
mr  
3F+HM 
mr

 
 
Panel A : Average Coefficient Results 
 
 
Number (#) of Positive and Negative Alphas 
Positive (# significant) 165   (7) 146   (4) 159   (7) 212   (30) 259   (38) 
Negative(#significant) 390   (65) 409   (85) 396   (79) 343   (54) 296   (43) 
 
Mean Values of Coefficients and t-statistics 
 Alpha 
(t-stat) 
-0.1761    
(-0.6391) 
-0.2274 
(-0.7783) 
-0.1955 
(-0.7299) 
-0.1129 
(-0.3009) 
-0.0684 
(-0.1141) 
   
mr  
(t-stat) 
0.9764  
(17.21) 
0.9590 
(17.88) 
0.9668 
(18.55) 
0.9509 
(17.91) 
0.9929 
(12.52) 
 SMB 
(t-stat) 
- 0.3207 
(2.31) 
0.3326 
(2.62) 
0.3365 
(2.70) 
0.3360 
(2.69) 
HML 
(t-stat) 
- - -0.2068 
(-0.9530) 
-0.1839 
(-0.8597) 
-0.1876 
(-0.8669) 
TM-Timing variable  
2
m
r  
- - - -0.0042 
(-0.4529) 
- 
HM-Timing variable :  
mr

 
- - - - -0.0756 
(-0.3683) 
 
Panel B : Diagnostics 
 
Mean R2 0.7266 0.7583 0.7812 0.7896 0.7879 
Skewness -0.1334 -0.1460 -0.1586 -0.1173 -0.1252 
Kurtosis 8.77 8.51 8.14 7.97 7.99 
BJ – statistic 3279.14 3298.54 3123.34 3071.70 3077.62 
% (Number) funds 
non-normal residuals 
36.58% 
(203 funds) 
40.36 
(224 funds) 
47.38% 
(263 funds) 
50.45% 
(280 
funds) 
50.09% 
(278 
funds) 
 
 Table 2  FDR: Different Independent Variables 
 
This table reports parameters and the FDR (at various significance levels) when testing the null 
that a particular parameter is zero (against the alternative that it is either positive or negative). 
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 
German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. We report the number (#) of 
statistically significant coefficients, the FDR, the proportion of statistically significant positive ( S  ) 
and negative ( S  ) alpha-funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and negative (T  ) alpha-
funds and the proportion of false positives ( F  ) and false negative ( F  ) alpha-funds, at various 
significance levels. Panel A reports the statistics on the 
mr , SMB and HML coefficients and Panel 
C for the TM and HM market timing coefficients.   
 
 
Panel A : Fama-French Factors 
 
 
Market Return 
mr  
Positive Coefficient (552 funds) Negative Coefficient (3 funds) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign.funds 544 544 546 547 Sign. funds 0 0 0 1 
FDR+ 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0023 FDR- N/A N/A N/A 1.2308
 
SMB variable 
Positive Coefficient (500 funds) Negative Coefficient (55 funds) 
Sign. Level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign.Funds 384 419 439 451 #Sign.Funds 9 17 20 26 
FDR+ 0.0085 0.0155 0.0222 0.0288 FDR- 0.3611 0.3824 0.4875 0.5000
 
HML variable 
Positive Coefficient (176 funds) Negative Coefficient (379 funds) 
Sign. Level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign.Funds 80 103 112 122 #Sign. funds 219 247 271 297 
FDR+ 0.0754 0.1172 0.1617 0.1979 FDR- 0.0276 0.0489 0.0668 0.0813
 
Panel B : Test on TM , 2
m
r   
 
Positive Coefficients (199 funds) Negative Coefficients (356 funds) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign. funds 43 60 80 97 #Sign. funds 116 158 182 217 
FDR+ 0.2434 0.3488 0.3924 0.4315 FDR- 0.0902 0.1325 0.1725 0.1929
S+ 0.0902 0.1325 0.1725 0.1929 S- 0.2090 0.2847 0.3279 0.3910
T+ 0.0586 0.0704 0.0876 0.0994 T- 0.1902 0.2470 0.2714 0.3156
F+ 0.0189 0.0377 0.0566 0.0754 F- 0.0189 0.0377 0.0566 0.0754
 
Panel C : Test on HM, 
mr

   
 
Positive Coefficients (204 funds) Negative Coefficients (351 funds) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign. funds 44 68 87 105 #Sign. funds 96 138 178 210 
FDR+ 0.2419 0.3130 0.3670 0.4054 FDR- 0.1109 0.1542 0.1794 0.2027
S+ 0.0793 0.1225 0.1568 0.1892 S- 0.1730 0.2486 0.3207 0.3784
T+ 0.0601 0.0842 0.0992 0.1125 T- 0.1538 0.2103 0.2632 0.3017
F+ 0.0192 0.0384 0.0575 0.0767 F- 0.0192 0.0384 0.0575 0.0767
 Table 3  Security Selection (Alpha): Fama-French 3F Model 
 
This table reports statistics to test for security selection (alpha) for the 3F model. The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 
(monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. We report the number (#) of statistically 
significant funds at various significance levels. Panel A reports the estimated proportions of truly null, skilled and unskilled funds. In panel B for 
various significance levels we report the FDR for positive and negative alpha funds, the proportion of statistically significant positive ( S  ) and 
negative ( S  ) alpha-funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and negative (T  ) alpha-funds and the proportion of false positives ( F  ) and 
false negative ( F  ) alpha-funds.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
Panel A : Proportion of Truly Null, Skilled and Unskilled Funds 
 
Proportion of Truly Null Funds : 0ˆ = 0.8316 ( 0.0325) 
Proportion, skilled funds :  Aˆ = -0.0024 (0.0020) 
 
Proportion, unskilled funds : Aˆ = 0.1708 (0.0324) 
 
Panel B : Calculation of FDR Statistics 
 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign. funds 14 26 37 53 #Sign. funds 121 174 218 253 
FDR  0.8242 0.8876 0.9356 0.8708 FDR 0.0954 0.1326 0.1588 0.1824 
S   0.0252 (0.0067) 0.0468 (0.0090) 0.0667 (0.0106) 0.0955 (0.0125) S   0.2180 (0.0175) 0.3135 (0.0197) 0.3928 (0.0207) 0.4559 (0.0211) 
T   0.0044 (0.0082) 0.0053 (0.0130) 0.0043 (0.0176) 0.0123 (0.0226) T   0.1972 (0.0185) 0.2719 (0.0227) 0.3304 (0.0265) 0.3727 (0.0301) 
F   0.0208 (0.0008) 0.0416 (0.0016) 0.0624 (0.0024) 0.0832 (0.0033) F   0.0208 (0.0008) 0.0416 (0.0016) 0.0624 (0.0024) 0.0832 (0.0033) 
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Table 4  Alpha Estimates: 3F+MT Models 
 
This table reports statistics to test for security selection (alpha) for the two, 3F+MT models. Panel A reports results for the 3F+TM model and 
Panel B for the 3F+HM model. The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled 
mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. We report the number (#) of statistically significant funds at various significance levels and the 
estimate of 0 used to calculate the FDR.  For various significance levels we report the FDR for positive and negative alpha funds, the proportion 
of statistically significant positive ( S  ) and negative ( S  ) alpha-funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and negative (T  ) alpha-funds and the 
proportion of false positives ( F  ) and false negative ( F  ) alpha-funds.  Standard errors are in parentheses.       
Panel A : TM-Model:     0ˆ  = 0.8263 ( 0.0299) 
Positive Alpha (212 funds) 
Proportion, skilled funds :  Aˆ = 0.0229 (0.0070) Negative Alpha (343 funds) Proportion, unskilled funds : Aˆ = 0.1508 (0.0293)   
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign. funds 50 64 91 115 #Sign. funds 85 126 162 197 
FDR  0.2293 0.3583 0.3779 0.3988 FDR 0.1349 0.1820 0.2123 0.2328 
S   0.0901 (0.0122) 0.1153 (0.0136) 0.1640 (0.0157) 0.2072 (0.0172) S   0.1532 (0.0153) 0.2270 (0.0178) 0.2919 (0.0193) 0.3550 (0.0203) 
T   0.0694 (0.0132) 0.0740 (0.0166) 0.1020 (0.0213) 0.1246 (0.0256) T   0.1325 (0.0162) 0.1857 (0.0206) 0.2299 (0.0246) 0.2723 (0.0286) 
F   0.0207 (0.0007) 0.0413 (0.0015) 0.0620 (0.0022) 0.0826 (0.0030) F   0.0207 (0.0007) 0.0413 (0.0015) 0.0620 (0.0022) 0.0826 (0.0030) 
Panel B : HM-Model:       0ˆ = 0.7872 ( 0.0326) 
Positive Alpha (259 funds)  
Proportion, skilled funds :  Aˆ = 0.0357 (0.0084) Negative Alpha (296 funds) Proportion, unskilled funds : Aˆ = 0.1770 (0.0318) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign. funds 63 96 115 137 #Sign. funds 72 109 143 178 
FDR  0.1734 0.2276 0.2849 0.3189 FDR 0.1517 0.2004 0.2292 0.2455 
S   0.1135 (0.0135) 0.1730 (0.0161) 0.2072 (0.0172) 0.2468 (0.0183) S   0.1297 (0.0143) 0.1964 (0.0169) 0.2577 (0.0186) 0.3207 (0.0198) 
T   0.0938 (0.0145) 0.1336 (0.0191) 0.1482 (0.0229) 0.1681 (0.0270) T   0.1100 (0.0153) 0.1570 (0.0198) 0.1986 (0.0241) 0.2420 (0.0285) 
F   0.0197 (0.0008) 0.0394 (0.0016) 0.0590 (0.0024) 0.0787 (0.0033) F   0.0197 (0.0008) 0.0394 (0.0016) 0.0590 (0.0024) 0.0787 (0.0033) 
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Table 5  Total Performance ( )perf : 3F+MT Models 
 
This table reports statistics to test for “total performance” ( )perf  for the two, 3F+MT models.  Panel A reports results for the 3F+TM model and 
Panel B for the 3F+HM model.  The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled 
mutual funds which have at least 24 observations.  We report the number (#) of statistically significant funds at various significance levels and the 
estimate of 0 used to calculate the FDR.  For various significance levels we report the FDR for positive and negative total performance 
( )perf funds, the proportion of statistically significant positive ( S  ) and negative ( S  ) perf funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and 
negative (T  ) perf funds and the proportion of false positives ( F  ) and false negative ( F  ) perf funds.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
Panel A: TM-Model:       0ˆ  = 0.8150 (0.0326) 
Positive perf (155 funds) 
Proportion, skilled funds :  Aˆ = -0.0023 (0.0020) Negative perf  (400 funds) Proportion, unskilled funds : Aˆ = 0.1873 (0.0324) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign funds 17 23 35 50 #Sign funds 104 158 211 246 
FDR+ 0.6652 0.9833 0.9692 0.9046 FDR- 0.1087 0.1431 0.1608 0.1839 
S+ 0.0306 
(0.0073) 
0.0414 
(0.0085)
0.0631 
(0.0103)
0.0901 
(0.0122)
S- 0.1874 
(0.0166)
0.2847 
(0.0192)
0.3802 
(0.0206)
0.4432 
(0.0211)
T+ 0.0103 
(0.0087) 
0.0007 
(0.0126)
0.0019 
(0.0174)
0.0086 
(0.0224)
T- 0.1670 
(0.0176)
0.2439 
(0.0221)
0.3191 
(0.0263)
0.3617 
(0.0300)
F+ 0.0204 
(0.0008) 
0.0407 
(0.0016)
0.0611 
(0.0024)
0.0815 
(0.0033)
F- 0.0204 
(0.0008)
0.0407 
(0.0016)
0.0611 
(0.0024)
0.0815 
(0.0033)
 
Panel B: HM-Model:         0ˆ  = 0.8094 (0.0326) 
Positive perf  (156 funds) 
Proportion, skilled funds :  Aˆ = -0.0022 (0.0020) Negative perf  (399 funds)  Proportion, unskilled funds : Aˆ = 0.1928 (0.0324) 
Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign funds 15 24 36 53 #Sign funds 96 159 207 235 
FDR+ 0.7487 0.9359 0.9359 0.8476 FDR- 0.1170 0.1413 0.1628 0.1912 
S+ 0.0270 
(0.0069) 
0.0432 
(0.0086)
0.0649 
(0.0105)
0.0955 
(0.0125)
S- 0.1730 
(0.0161)
0.2865 
(0.0192)
0.3730 
(0.0205)
0.4234 
(0.0210)
 4
T+ 0.0068 
(0.0084) 
0.0028 
(0.0127)
0.0042 
(0.0175)
0.0146 
(0.0226)
T- 0.1527 
(0.0171)
0.2460 
(0.0222)
0.3123 
(0.0262)
0.3425 
(0.0298)
F+ 0.0202 
(0.0008) 
0.0405 
(0.0016)
0.0607 
(0.0024)
0.0809 
(0.0033)
F- 0.0202 
(0.0008)
0.0405 
(0.0016)
0.0607 
(0.0024)
0.0809 
(0.0033)
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Table 6  Security Selection (Alpha):  3F Model, Different Geographic Regions 
 
This table reports statistics to test for security selection (alpha) for the 3F model.  The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 
(monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. We report the number (#) of statistically 
significant funds at various significance levels.  Panel A (Panel B) reports results for funds investing in only German companies (non-German 
companies).  For various significance levels we report the FDR for positive and negative alpha funds, the proportion of statistically significant 
positive ( S  ) and negative ( S  ) alpha-funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and negative (T  ) alpha-funds and the proportion of false 
positives ( F  ) and false negative ( F  ) alpha-funds.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
Panel A : German Companies (85 funds)   
 
Positive Alpha (22 funds) 
 
 
Negative  Alpha (63 funds) 
 
Sign level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Sign level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
#Sign Funds 2 4 7 9 #Sign Funds 17 30 32 39 
FDR+ 0.8836 0.8836 0.7574 0.7854 FDR- 0.1040 0.1178 0.1657 0.1812 
S+ 0.0235 
(0.0164)
0.0471 
(0.0230)
0.0824 
(0.0298)
0.1059 
(0.0334)
S- 0.2000 
(0.0434)
0.3529 
(0.0518)
0.3765 
(0.0526)
0.4588 
(0.0540)
T+ 0.0027 
(0.0179)
0.0055 
(0.0270)
0.0200 
(0.0367)
0.0227 
(0.0439)
T- 0.1792 
(0.0444)
0.3114 
(0.0550)
0.3141 
(0.0585)
0.3757 
(0.0636)
F+ 0.0208 
(0.0018)
0.0416 
(0.0036)
0.0624 
(0.0054)
0.0832 
(0.0072)
F- 0.0208 
(0.0018)
0.0416 
(0.0036)
0.0624 
(0.0054)
0.0832 
(0.0072)
 
Panel B : Non-German Companies (470 funds)      
 
Positive Alpha (137 funds) 
 
 
Negative  Alpha (333 funds) 
 
Significance 
level 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Significance 
level 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
# Sign Funds 12 22 30 44 Number of 
Significant 
Funds 
104 144 186 214 
FDR+ 0.8143 0.8883 0.9771 0.8883 FDR- 0.0940 0.1357 0.1576 0.1826 
S+ 0.0255 0.0468 0.0638 0.0936 S- 0.2213 0.3064 0.3957 0.4553 
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(0.0073) (0.0097) (0.0113) (0.0134) (0.0191) (0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0230)
T+ 0.0047 
(0.0088)
0.0052 
(0.0138)
0.0015 
(0.0185)
0.0105 
(0.0238)
T- 0.2005 
(0.0202)
0.2648 
(0.0245)
0.3334 
(0.0286)
0.3722 
(0.0325)
F+ 0.0208 
(0.0009)
0.0416 
(0.0017)
0.0624 
(0.0026)
0.0832 
(0.0035)
F- 0.0208 
(0.0009)
0.0416 
(0.0017)
0.0624 
(0.0026)
0.0832 
(0.0035)
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Table 7  Performance: Alternative Models  
 
This table reports performance measures for different models. Panel A reports statistics to test for security selection (alpha) in the 1F (market 
return) and 2F model (market return and SMB factor).  Panel B reports statistics to test for “total performance” ( )perf  for the 1F+TM and 2F+TM 
timing models while Panel C repeats the latter for the HM timing model.  The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2009 (monthly 
data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations.  We report the FDR for positive and negative alpha 
funds, the proportion of statistically significant positive ( S  ) and negative ( S  ) alpha-funds, the proportion of truly positive (T  ) and negative 
(T  ) alpha-funds and the proportion of false positives ( F  ) and false negative ( F  ) alpha-funds.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  All test 
results are reported for a significance level of 10% (two tail test). 
 
 
Panel A : Security Selection (alpha): 1F and 2F Models 
 
 
1F Model 
 0ˆ = 0.8700 (0.0296) 
 
2F Model  
0ˆ = 0.7875 ( 0.0326) 
 
Positive Alpha ˆ = -0.0044 (0.0009) 
 
Negative Alpha ˆ = 0.1343 (0.0295) 
 
Positive Alpha ˆ = -0.0021 (0.0020) 
 
Negative Alpha ˆ = 0.2149 (0.0325) 
#Funds 165 #Funds 390 #Funds 146 # Funds 409 
#Sign funds 25 #Sign funds 161 #Sign funds 25 #Sign funds 184 
FDR+ 0.9657 FDR- 0.1500 FDR+ 0.8738 FDR- 0.1187 
S+ 0.0450 
(0.0088) 
S- 0.2901 
(0.0193) 
S+ 0.0450 
(0.0088) 
S- 0.3315 
(0.0200) 
T+ 0.0015 
(0.0126) 
T- 0.2466 
(0.0231) 
T+ 0.0057 
(0.0129) 
T- 0.2922 
(0.0230) 
F+ 0.0435 
(0.0015) 
F- 0.0435 
(0.0015) 
F+ 0.0394 
(0.0016) 
F- 0.0394 
(0.0016) 
 
Panel B:  perf , 1F+TM and 2F+TM Timing Models 
 
 
1F+TM Model 
0ˆ  = 0.8676  (0.0323) 
 
2F+TM Model 
0ˆ = 0.8082 (0.0301) 
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Positive perf  ˆ = -0.0007 (0.0027) 
 
Negative perf  ˆ = 0.1331 (0.0322)  
 
Positive perf  ˆ = -0.0022 (0.0020) 
 
Negative perf  ˆ = 0.1940 (0.0299) 
#Funds 165 #Funds 390 # Funds 144 #Funds 411 
#Sign funds 23 #Sign  funds 144 #Sign  funds 26 #Sign funds 172 
FDR+ 1.0468 FDR- 0.1672 FDR+ 0.8626 FDR- 0.1304 
S+ 0.0414 
(0.0085) 
S- 0.2595 
(0.0186) 
S+ 0.0468 
(0.0090) 
S- 0.3099 
(0.0196) 
T+ -0.0019 
(0.0126) 
T- 0.2161 
(0.0216) 
T+ 0.0064 
(0.0127) 
T- 0.2695 
(0.0225) 
F+ 0.0434 
(0.0016) 
F- 0.0434 
(0.0016) 
F+ 0.0404 
(0.0015) 
F- 0.0404 
(0.0015) 
 
Panel C:  perf , 1F+HM and 2F+HM Timing Models 
 
 
1F+HM Model 
0ˆ  = 0.8700 (0.0296) 
 
2F+HM Model 
0ˆ = 0.7902 (0.0301) 
 
Positive perf  ˆ = -0.0007 (0.0027) 
 
Negative perf  ˆ = 0.1307 (0.0294)  
 
Positive perf  ˆ = 0.0015 (0.0032) 
 
Negative perf  ˆ = 0.2083 (0.0299) 
#Funds 166 #Funds 398 #Funds 152 #Funds 403 
#Sign funds 25 #Sign funds 140 #Sign funds 25 #Sign  funds 166 
FDR+ 0.9657 FDR- 0.1724 FDR+ 0.8771 FDR- 0.1321 
S+ 0.0450 
(0.0088) 
S- 0.2523 
(0.0184) 
S+ 0.0450 
(0.0088) 
S- 0.2991 
(0.0194) 
T+ 0.0015 
(0.0126) 
T- 0.2088 
(0.0213) 
T+ 0.0055 
(0.0126) 
T- 0.2596 
(0.0223) 
F+ 0.0435 
(0.0015) 
F- 0.0435 
(0.0015) 
F+ 0.0395 
(0.0015) 
F- 0.0395 
(0.0015) 
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Figure 1  Cross-Section Fund Alphas: 3F Model 
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Figure 2   Calculation of 0 :  p-values from 3F Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
p-values of skilled and unskilled funds 

Area to the right of l are p-values of 
zero-alpha funds = {# p > }/M where 
M is the total number of funds.   
%83ˆ0 
Area under this line  0 = [1/1-]{#p>}/M 
     = 0.83 
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Figure 3  Correlation coefficient: alphas and TM timing coefficients (Rolling Window) 
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Figure 4  Correlation Coefficient: alphas and HM timing coefficients (Rolling Window) 
 
 
 
 
